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I. INTRODUCTION
Ohio's physicians presently face an intractable legal problem: under what
circumstances may a physician order the application or discontinuance of life support
systems1 for a terminally i112 patient without incurring civil or criminal liability?
Ohio's terminally ill patients face the concomitant problem: how may they best ensure
that a physician will effectuate their intent to use or not use life support systems? The
argument presented by this Note contends that Ohio case law provides insufficient
solutions to the foregoing problems and, more specifically, that the Ohio General
Assembly should substantially supplant the case law with legislation similar to The
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act as proffered by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).3
I. THE OHIO PRECEDENT
A. Leach I: Privacy and the Right to Remove
Both the Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio General Assembly have remained
conspicuously silent on the topics of the use of life support systems and the treatment
choices available to the terminally ill. Consequently, Ohio's physicians and attorneys
must turn to the state's lower courts when attempting to determine the rights and
responsibilities of physicians and patients facing these particular treatment problems.
The Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, rendered the first
decision on point in its 1980 opinion, Leach v. Akron General Medical Center (Leach
I).4 Marie Leach, a seventy year old woman diagnosed as suffering from amytrophic
lateral sclerosis (a degenerative neuro-muscular disorder), incurred a cardiac arrest on
July 29, 1980 while hospitalized. 5 Though physicians restored her heartbeat, her
condition prompted physicians to place Mrs. Leach on a life support system. Mrs.
Leach had lapsed into a chronic vegetative state. Neurological testimony, adduced at
trial, unanimously confirmed that Mrs. Leach was suffering from irreversible brain
1. A life support system is defined as a respirator which assists or compels respiration, a nasogastro tube which
aids in the feeding process, and a catheter which dispels waste. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc.
1, 3,426 N.E.2d 809, 810 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div. 1980).
2. This Note addresses only the rights of patients who have been medically diagnosed as terminally ill. Living will
statutes typically define terminal illness as a condition from which there can be no recovery and because of which death
is imminent. See, e.g., VA. Cone § 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1985).
3. THm RImHTs OF TiE TERMNALY IML Acr §§ 1-12 (Tent. Draft 1984).
4. 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div. 1980).
5. Id. at 2, 426 N.E.2d at 810.
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damage. 6 Though not brain dead, Mrs. Leach was completely without cognitive
powers, and the chances of restoring her to a cognitive or sapient state were described
as "highly unlikely.'' 7 Upon successfully seeking appointment as Mrs. Leach's
guardian, Mr. Leach instituted an action to compel discontinuance of Mrs. Leach's
life support system.8
Faced with this set of facts, the Leach I court followed the lead of several other
states in empowering Mr. Leach, as the patient's guardian, to direct the withdrawal
of Mrs. Leach's respirator.9 Drawing from the constitutional analysis of In re
Quinlan,o the court held that the right to privacy "guarantees to an incurably,
terminally ill person, who is in a permanent, vegetative state, the right to decide future
medical treatment."I 1 The Leach I court granted Mrs. Leach's guardian the authority
to decide for her. However, the court enabled her guardian to direct discontinuance
only upon the finding of the fact "that Edna Marie Leach, in her present physical
condition, if competent, would elect not to be placed on or continued on life
supports .... "1 2 In support of permitting a guardian to make treatment decisions for
the presently comatose ward, the court commented: "'We cannot but emphasize that
there must exist a mechanism to ascertain and to implement the patient's consent. To
deny the exercise because the patient is unconscious is to deny the right." '"13
Almost perfunctorily, the court dismissed as less than compelling the alleged
state interests in maintaining Mrs. Leach's life supports. Though the defendants
posited the preservation of life as a compelling state interest, the court "could see no
possible benefit to the state by briefly extending the minimal life of an incurably ill,
6. Id. at4, 426 N.E.2d at 811.
7. Id. at 5,426 N.E.2d at 811 (testimony of Dr. Richard J. Lederman, a neurologist). At this point, it may be
helpful to distinguish Mrs. Leach's chronic vegetative state from brain death. Death, as presently defined in Ohio (the
definitional statute was not yet in force at the time Leach I was decided), occurs when an individual "has sustained either
irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the brain .. .as
determined in accordance with accepted medical standards." Oiuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Page Supp. 1984).
Commonly, the Harvard Test is the standard utilized: 1) lack of receptivity and response to painful stimuli; 2) no
spontaneous movements or breathing; 3) no reflexes; and 4) a flat EEG (all tests to be repeated twenty-four hours later
with the same results). Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death
Report:A Definition of "Irreversible Coma," in I THE Da. xiAS oF EumANAstA 161-63 (J. Behnke & S. Bok eds. 1975).
In its final paragraph, the Ohio statute absolves physicians and those under their direction from civil or criminal liability
for acting in good faith reliance on a physician's determination of brain death. Onto REv. COD ANN. § 2108.30 (Page Supp.
1984). In short, since a physician may remove life support systems without fear of liability, the brain dead patient poses
no significant legal problems.
8. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3,426 N.E.2d 809, 811 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980).
9. Id. at 12, 426 N.E.2d at 816. For cases from other states allowing a patient's guardian to direct the withdrawal
of the patient's respirator, see Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980);
Supt. Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431,426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified
sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
10. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom., 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
11. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12,426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (cases dealing with the right to privacy).
12. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 5,426 N.E.2d 809, 812 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980). The court found Mrs. Leach would have so elected. See infra text accompanying notes 23-24.
13. Id. at 8, 426 N.E.2d at 813 (quoting In re Eichner, 73 A.D.2d 431, 470, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 546 (1980),
modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981)).
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seventy-year-old, semi-comatose woman." ' 14 The court concluded the interest in
protecting third parties was insignificant, noting Mrs. Leach's husband and children
approved seeking life support removal.' 5 The court further held that discontinuing
Mrs. Leach's life supports would not impugn the ethical integrity of the medical
profession, finding discontinuance consistent "with the current state of medical
ethics.' 1 6 Finally, the court determined that Mrs. Leach's treatment decision did not
implicate the state's interest in preventing suicide: "Suicide requires a specific intent
to die. Withdrawal of a respirator evinces only an intent to forego extraordinary
measures, and allows the processes of nature to run their course."' 7 The court
concluded "that no state interest, either legal or societal, exists to the degree
necessary to outweigh the Constitutional right of Edna Marie Leach... to choose
medical treatment." 18
B. Leach I: Uncertainty is the Rule
Leach I, though a thoughtful constitutional approach sound on its facts, suffers
from inherent limitations which render it insufficient in its ability to provide adequate
rules with which to govern the various life support fact patterns.
First, Leach I is quite simply a trial court decision. Though a case of first
impression persuasively reasoned, Leach I is not binding precedent on any court in
the state. Until the Ohio Supreme Court or the General Assembly addresses the issues
raised in Leach I, uncertainty will remain the rule.
Second, Leach I addresses only the rights of a limited patient class: patients who
are terminally ill, comatose, and currently maintained by a life support system. By
way of inference one might argue that competent, terminally ill patients attached to
life supports might also successfully seek probate court intervention to secure removal
of a respirator. But nowhere in the opinion is this fact pattern considered. Moreover,
Leach I fails to address the treatment options of the terminally ill patient (whether
competent or comatose) before life supports are actually applied. May a patient refuse
life supports prior to application, or must he or she wait, seeking judicial intervention
only after application? Leach I offers no answer.
Third, Leach I inadequately safeguards the rights of the patient class to which it
applies: terminally ill, comatose patients currently maintained on life supports. Leach
I implicitly requires a patient or his guardian to repair to the probate court for an order
of discontinuance. 19 Physicians, even those previously disposed toward discontinu-
ance in hopeless cases, may now fear to order life support removal without first
securing a probate court order. Consequently, Leach I may engender increased
probate court litigation as physicians seek judicial support for medical orders they
may have made previously as a matter of course. Furthermore, Leach I specifically
14. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1,9,426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980).
15. Id. at 9-10, 426 N.E.2d at 814.
16. Id. at 10, 426 N.E.2d at 815.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 12-13, 426 N.E.2d at 816.
1985]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
limits the scope of its decree to its particular facts, 20 drawing into question the
applicability of these procedures even to future similarly situated litigants.2' The court
not only limited the decree to particular facts, but the order itself permitted only
discontinuance of Mrs. Leach's respirator. 22 Are the other components of the life
support system not to be removed in any case? One may only answer with specula-
tion.
Last, Leach I seems to establish a requisite fact finding that may prove to deny
many terminally ill, comatose patients the alternative of judicial relief. As part of the
court's listed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court held that "Edna Marie
Leach, if competent, would elect not to be placed on life supports." 23 Testimony of
Mrs. Leach's previous conversations with friends and relatives regarding her desire
not to be maintained on life supports prompted the court's finding. 24 Certainly this
fact finding helps to ensure that the patient's intent is effectuated, but if this fact
finding is a requisite to life support removal, the intent of other patients may be
subverted. For example, consider under the Leach I rule the chronic vegetative patient
who had not previously expressed strong desires regarding the use of life support
systems. Should this patient be beyond judicial aid in securing the discontinuance of
life supports? Under Leach I this may be the case: no determination of prior intent,
no discontinuance.
Karen Quinlan had made no determinative statements regarding the use or
nonuse of life supports before she slipped into an irreversible coma.23 It seems likely
that her guardian would have been incapable of establishing that Karen "if competent,
would elect not to be placed on life supports.' '26 Ironically, under Leach I, a case
which openly borrows from the Quinlan decision, Karen Quinlan's guardian in all
likelihood would have been unsuccessful in securing removal of Ms. Quinlan's life
support system.
20. Note, Right to Privacy: Removal of Life-Support Systems, 16 AKsoN L. REv. 162, 169 (1982).
21. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12,426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980). The Leach I court required the following procedures to be followed in carrying out its order of discontinuation:
I)A licensed physician and neurologist selected by the guardian must examine and then certify that Edna Marie
Leach continues in a permanent vegetative state, and that there is no reasonable medical possibility that she will
regain any sapient or cognitive function.
2)A forty-eight hour notice of the examination must be given to the Summit County Coroner and Prosecutor.
The Coroner's and Prosecutor's Office may have a witness or witnesses present at the examination.
3)When the examination is complete, a forty-eight hour notice of the act of discontinuation must be given to
the Summit County Coroner's and Prosecutor's Office.
Id. For an example of postorder procedures drafted to apply to future similarly situated litigants, see In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 54-55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert. denied sub nom., 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
22. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 13,426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980).
23. Id. at 5, 12, 426 N.E.2d at 812, 816.
24. Id. at 4, 426 N.E.2d at 811.
25. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied sub nom., 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The court
stated:
The sad truth, however, is that [Karen] is grossly incompetent and we cannot discem her supposed choice based
on the testimony of her previous conversations with friends. . . . Nevertheless we have concluded that Karen's
right of privacy may be asserted on her behalf by her guardian under the peculiar circumstances here present.
Id.
26. Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 12, 426 N.E.2d 809, 816 (C.P. Summit Co. P. Div.
1980).
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The limitations of Leach I, now apparent, demand attention. But first, any
attempt to remedy the insufficiencies of Leach I requires consideration of the other
Ohio life support case.
C. Leach II: Informed Consent and the Right to Refuse
In a separate and subsequent action filed on behalf of Mrs. Leach's estate, the
Court of Appeals of Summit County addressed Mrs. Leach's right to refuse life
support treatment prior to life support application. 27 The issue was not whether and
under what circumstances a patient may secure the removal of life supports, but
whether or not a cause of action for wrongful application of life supports existed. 28
The court decided a wrongful application cause of action was judicially cognizable
and remanded the case for further fact finding. 29
Reversing the trial court's grant of defendants' 12(B)(6)30 motion to dismiss, the
court applied the common law doctrines of battery and informed consent rather than
the constitutional analysis of Leach 1.31 Informed consent doctrine requires a physi-
cian to disclose to a patient all material facts pertaining to that patient's condition,
including likely risks involved in treatment. 32 Treatment without disclosure and
without subsequent patient consent gives rise to liability for battery. The represen-
tative of Mrs. Leach's estate alleged that physicians not only ordered the application
of life supports without the consent of Mrs. Leach or her family, but in direct
contravention of Mrs. Leach's express desires. 33 Recognizing that a medical emer-
gency may give rise to implied consent to treatment, the court nevertheless concluded
that "where the parties contract expressly with regard to a particular procedure, an
implied agreement cannot thereafter arise when the express agreement directly
controverts the inclusion of any such implication."-34 In short, if Mrs. Leach expressly
refused life support application, subsequent application-emergency or no emer-
gency-would trigger physician liability for battery.
The court added one caveat: the patient's life support refusal "must satisfy the
same standards of knowledge and understanding required for informed consent.''35
The patient must be made to understand the risks incident to life support removal.
This cautionary standard appears to be employed to insure that patients who have
expressed vague or casual desires to die peacefully will not be denied treatment by
liability-fearing physicians.
Finally, the court affirmed the vitality of Leach I, holding that once introduced
27. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
28. Id. at 395, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.
29. Id. at 393, 398, 469 N.E.2d at 1047, 1055.
30. Osio R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6).
31. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (1984).
32. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, reh'g denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
33. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 396, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (1984).
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
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as part of an authorized treatment plan, life supports may only be withdrawn from a
comatose patient via court order.36
D. Leach II: Not Enough to Fill the Void
1. Strengthening Self-Determination
Leach 11, recognizing the doctrine of informed consent as the common law
foundation supporting a patient's right to refuse the application of life support
systems, 37 strengthened the terminal patient's ability to control the quantity and
quality of medical treatment he or she receives. However, this doctrine, seemingly
designed to protect a patient's right to self-determination, often fails to do just that.
In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston,38 in which a patient's mother
refused to consent to blood transfusions thereby threatening the life of her child, the
New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the right of the hospital to administer the
transfusions, reasoning that medical discretion may supersede a patient's interests:
[W]hen the hospital and staff are thus involuntary hosts and their interests are pitted against
the belief of the patient, we think it reasonable to resolve the problem by permitting the
hospital and its staff to pursue their functions according to their professional standards. The
solution sides with life, the conservation of which is, we think, a matter of state interest. 39
Leach 11 implicitly rejects a balancing of physician and patient interests where
the patient has expressly refused treatment. The court clearly denounces the
impermissible use of implied consent to defeat patient intent: "Carried to its
extreme... the doctrine of implied consent could effectively nullify those privacy
rights recognized in In re Quinlan. . .and Leach I. . .since a physician could
circumvent the express wishes of a terminal patient by waiting to act until the patient
was comatose and critical." 40 In short, Leach 1 reinforces the use of informed consent
as a method of securing the terminally ill patient's right to self-determination. Indeed,
"Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determination.
It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if
he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or
other medical treatment.' '41
2. An Insufficient Solution
Though Leach 11 recognizes the right of a terminally ill patient to refuse life
supports and also supplies a remedy in tort for denial of that right, its inherent
36. Id. at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
37. Id. at 395, 469 N.E.2d at 1051. See also notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
38. 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971).
39. Id. at 583, 279 A.2d at 673. See also Freamon, Death with Dignity Laws: A Plea for Uniform Legislation, 5
SEmoN HAuL LEois. J. 105, 111 (1982).
40. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 396-97, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (1984).
41. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 406-07, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960) (emphasis added). See also Congrove
v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (1973). In Congrove, an Ohio court approvingly paraphrases the above
cited language from Natanson, commenting that "the law does not permit [a physician] to substitute his own judgment
for that of the patient." Id. at 103, 308 N.E.2d at 770.
1024 [Vol. 46:1019
TOWARD AN OHIO NATURAL DEATH ACT
limitations, like those of its predecessor, render it incapable of filling the gap in Ohio
life support law.
Procedurally, Leach II reached the Court of Appeals after failing to survive
defendants' 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. 42 Consequently, no trial transcript and no
evidence were available for appellate review. The plaintiffs' complaint and defen-
dants' response thereto provided a sparse record from which to make law of such
import. This procedural limitation mutes Leach H's ability to speak to the details of
the life support application question.
Leach II holds that a terminally ill patient may recover in tort from a physician
who attaches the patient to life supports contrary to that patient's express wishes. 43
But what constitutes express wishes and who may convey them? Leach H's procedural
posture gave the court no record from which to glean answers to these and other
questions. Even more disconcerting, the court comments that it wishes to protect both
doctor and patient from "statements not made in contemplation of the specific
circumstances and the specific medical treatment required."44 Will the court give no
weight to a patient's desire to refuse life supports if not conveyed in apprehension of
imminent, irreversible coma? Or is this cited material mere advisory dictum? The
opinion provides little guidance.
Early in the text, commenting on the general law of informed consent, the court
noted that "[w]here the patient is not competent to consent, an authorized person may
consent in the patient's behalf. 45 Who is an authorized person-a guardian, spouse,
immediate or extended family member? More importantly, may this authorized
person refuse treatment as well as give consent? If the authorized person may refuse,
must he or she base the decision on the patient's express wishes? What may the
authorized person decide if the patient's express wishes are not apparent? The opinion
offers no answers to these questions. Physicians, patients, and their lawyers may only
speculate.
Substantively, Leach II raises other concerns not so easily explained. First,
Leach II acknowledges the constitutionally based right to privacy approach of Leach
1,46 but shuns this approach in analyzing Mrs. Leach's right to refuse life support
application. Are we to assume that the distinction between life support removal and
life support refusal is of constitutional consequence? Regardless, if the trial and
appellate courts of Summit County cannot agree on the applicable source of law, the
prospect of state wide uniformity (absent state supreme court or legislative action)
appears slim and the prospect of uncertainty appears likely.
Second, the court in Leach II saw fit to affirm in dicta the result of Leach I: "We
join these courts that require judicial authority for the termination of life-prolonging
treatment of an incompetent patient." 47 Interestingly, the issue of life support
termination or removal was not properly before the court and was in fact quite moot-
42. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 395, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (1984).
43. Id. at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1054.
44. Id. at 397, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
45. Id. at 395, 469 N.E.2d at 1052.
46. Id. at 396, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
47. Id.
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Mrs. Leach had died three years earlier.48 Why the court affirmed the Leach I result
(without even citing Leach 1) is far from clear. The court never said a competent
patient can secure life support removal with or without judicial intervention, though
either outcome would seem harmonious with the court's analysis of the refusal
question. If a competent patient can refuse treatment, surely he or she can refuse
continued treatment. Though the logic may be appealing, it is the author's, not the
court's. Because the court only mentions the removal question in dicta, the removal
rights of the competent (noncomatose) patient remain uncertain.
E. Awaiting a Solution
In sum, Leach I and Leach II stand for two propositions. First, the right exists
for the terminally ill, comatose patient to secure removal of life supports. Second, the
terminally ill, competent patient may refuse life support application and enforce that
refusal with a cause of action in tort. But the scope of these rights, the methods in
which they may be exercised, and their applicability to similarly situated patients
remain in doubt. The common law, whether gleaned from the doctrine of informed
consent or the constitutional right to privacy, may provide solutions to specific life
support problems before a court.49 But will case by case decisions eradicate physician
liability in effectuating patient intent? Clearly not. The limitations of the two Ohio
opinions are glaring, but not for want of sound legal reasoning or judicial decision
making. Lower courts simply cannot provide uniform rules, and no court can do more
than resolve a dispute among the litigants before it. Courts cannot magically produce
litigants to present the particular issues that must be addressed.
Recognition of the judiciary's inability to solve the life support problem is not
enough. The explosive growth of sophisticated medical techniques guarantees that
large numbers of patients and physicians will face daily life support decisions with
only insufficient legal guidelines defining their respective rights and responsibili-
ties. Because our "capacity to prolong life exceeds our capacity to cure," 50 the
pool of implicated parties will only grow larger. The law must move swiftly and
efficiently to keep pace. The court in Leach 11 noted that it must decide life support
cases "[u]ntil such time as the legislature provides some more efficient means of
protecting the rights of patients in Mrs. Leach's condition . . . ."5 That time has
surely come.
According to Bernard Freamon, Assistant Professor of Law at Seton Hall Law
Center and a proponent of uniform life support laws, "legislation is the only concrete
approach available to our legal system in dealing with problems associated with the
terminally ill.' '52 The legislature, with its ability to deliberate and seek input from all
segments of the medical and legal communities, is eminently better suited than a court
to address life support issues. Though a court is bound to resolve disputes only among
48. Mrs. Leach died January 6, 1981. Id. at 394, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.
49. See Freamon, supra note 39, at 114.
50. Note, The Kansas Natural Death Act, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 519 (1979-1980).
51. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 396, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052-53 (1984).
52. Freamon, supra note 39, at 119.
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present litigants, the legislature may conduct an inquiry broad enough to formulate a
workable framework for all potentially implicated parties.
I. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
To date, the legislatures of twenty-two states and the District of Columbia have
enacted "living will" legislation53 detailing the rights and responsibilities of patients
and physicians facing the life support decision. Typically, each statute authorizes
competent patients to execute a directive, or living will, which requires their attending
physicians to conduct treatment in accord with their desires in the event of terminal
illness. 54 All of the states, save Arkansas, 55 require a diagnosis of terminal illness prior
to life support withdrawal. As Freamon notes, "[tihe directive, put simply, is nothing
more than a written memorialization of the patient's instructions to his doctor. '" 56
Living will statutes aid the terminally ill patient and his or her physician in three
ways. First, a living will defines the scope of the patient's informed consent.
Adequately drafted, a living will conveys patient intent, providing "definitive
evidence of a patient's prior wishes.' 57 Quite simply, a living will tells a doctor that
the patient consents to procedure X, but refuses treatment Y. Second, the nature and
extent of a patient's consent made apparent, the directive diminishes the need for
costly, cumbersome litigation. 58 Third, all living will statutes grant physicians
criminal and civil immunity for acting in accord with the will's provisions.5 9
Eliminating the risk of liability encourages physicians to act in a situation where the
fear of a civil suit or criminal prosecution might otherwise inhibit their actions. The
immunity provisions aid the physician in effectuating patient intent.
Beyond these three common characteristics, living will statutes vary-both in
overall scope and insignificant detail. At the risk of overgeneralization, this Note will
address the advantages and disadvantages of three legislative approaches, seeking an
53. See AlA. CODE § 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALrn
& SAFETY CODE 88 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985); DE. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2508 (1983); D.C. CoDE ANN. §8
6-2421 to 2430 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985);
Iapo CoDE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, §§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 65-28-101 to -109 (1980); LA. REy. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CoDE ANN. 88
41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1984); NEv. Ra,. STAT. 88 449.540-.690 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -10 (1978
& Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. 88 90-320 to -322 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. 88 97.050-.090 (1983); TEX. Ray. Cirv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1985); VA. CoDE §
54-325.8:1-13 (Supp. 1985); WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-I to -10
(1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. §8 154.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. 88 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1985).
54. Freamon, supra note 39, at 123. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (1983); WusH. Ray. CoDE ANN. 88
70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1984).
55. See ARK. STAT. ANN. 88 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985).
56. Freamon, supra note 39, at 124.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Freamon, supra note 39, at 133. See, e.g., IL.. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985):
No physician, licensed health care professional, medical care facility or employee thereof who in good faith and
pursuant to reasonable medical standards causes or participates in the withholding or withdrawing of life-
sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to a declaration which purports to have been made in
accordance with this Act shall as a result thereof, be subject to criminal or civil liability, or be found to have
committed an act of unprofessional conduct.
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efficient statutory scheme with which to supplement, if not supplant, current Ohio
law.6O
A. The California Approach
Three states, California, Idaho, and Texas, enforce a living will if and only if the
patient executed the document subsequent to a diagnosis of terminal illness. 61 While
the Idaho statute does not address the binding effect of a living will executed prior to
a terminal diagnosis, the California and Texas acts, in identical language, permit the
physician to "give weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's directions," but
absolve the physician of any liability if he or she fails to comply. 62 In other words,
a living will executed in advance of a terminal diagnosis is merely advisory. Though
the California approach takes significant strides beyond the common law to insure that
physicians will comply with their patients' treatment requests, it falls short in
significant respects.
The California approach, though inventive and trail-blazing at its enactment, 63
fails to adequately address the needs of two patient groups: patients who execute a
living will prior to a terminal diagnosis and patients who do not execute a living will
at all. Group one patients-those holding prediagnosis wills-may reexecute wills,
securing the effectuation of their intent. 64 However, should group one patients lapse
into coma prior to reexecution, their express wishes, as memorialized in the predi-
agnosis will, become merely advisory. The postdiagnosis requirement, designed to
promote serious reflection and "finality of decision,''65 may instead thwart patient
intent, prolonging pain and expense.
Admittedly, the California approach provides a procedure by which patients who
can comply with its postdiagnosis requirement may secure the effectuation of their
intent. However, the advisory nature of a prediagnosis will and the approach's
generally limited scope prevent it from filling the void in Ohio common law.
Section 7191(c) of the California act, if adopted in Ohio, would eliminate the
Leach II wrongful application remedy for group one patients. Section 7191(c)
absolves physicians from civil or criminal liability for failing to effectuate a predi-
agnosis will, 66 while Leach II provides a civil remedy for application or retention
contrary to the patient's express wishes. 67 If Leach II took a tentative step toward
effectuating a patient's express wishes, adopting the California approach in Ohio
60. The legislative approaches are labeled by state name for ease of recall and reference. The states chosen are
merely illustrative of a particular legislative approach. The acts of more than one state may be used to demonstrate the
characteristics of a particular approach.
61. CAL. HEATH & SAv CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4503 to -4504 (1985); TEx. REv. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, §§ 2(5), 7(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985). See also Freamon, supra note 39, at 125.
62. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 7191(c) (West Supp. 1985); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h, § 7(c)
(Vernon Supp. 1985).
63. The California act, the f'rst of the living will statutes, passed the state legislature September 30, 1976 and
became effective January 1, 1977. 1976 Cal. Stat. 6478.
64. CAL. HEALH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1985).
65. Freamon, supra note 39, at 125.
66. CAL. HEr & SAFsTv CODE § 7191(c) (West Supp. 1985).
67. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App. 3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
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would signal retreat, permitting physicians under a shield of immunity to ignore a
patient's intent expressed prior to diagnosis of terminal illness.
Similarly, the California approach constitutes no improvement over Ohio law
with respect to group two patients-those who have not executed a living will at all.
The enactment of a statute based on section 7193 of the California act would preserve
an Ohio patient's common law rights under Leach I and II. Section 7193 provides in
part: "Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supercede any legal right or legal
responsibility which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures .... ",68 However, a provision similar to section 16-30-9
of the West Virginia Natural Death Act69 might better preserve these limited rights.
The West Virginia provision mirrors the quoted California section but adds: "This
article creates no presumption concerning the intention of an individual who has not
executed . . . [a living will]. "70
But is an act which offers little improvement over Leach I and ! desirable? The
California approach would leave Ohio's Karen Quinlans and Edna Marie Leaches
with nothing more than their cumbersome common law rights, replete with inade-
quacies. Must the legislature leave the group two patient, the patient who has not
executed a living will, with only his limited Leach rights? Surely not. Alternatives
exist that demand consideration.
B. The North Carolina Approach
The General Assembly of North Carolina moved to fill the perceived inadequa-
cies of the California approach by enacting the North Carolina Natural Death Act in
June of 1977.71 The North Carolina approach neither impairs the effectiveness of a
living will executed prior to a terminal diagnosis nor ignores the right of the patient
who never executed a living will. States adhering to the North Carolina approach
include Florida, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon, and Virginia. 72
The North Carolina approach typically provides that "[a]ny competent adult
may, at any time" 73 execute a living will; date of execution in no way diminishes the
effectiveness of the document.74 Supporters of the California approach suggest this
provision allows for casual decision making at a time remote from the hard facts of
terminal illness. They worry that "the hale and hearty executive of forty who files a
living will in a burst of exuberance may have second thoughts on the matter when
actually confronting the situation." 7 5 Proponents of the North Carolina approach
68. CAt. HEALTH & SAFEr CODE § 7193 (West Supp. 1985).
69. W. VA. CoDE § 16-30-9(a), (b) (1985).
70. Id.
71. N.C. GE. STAT. 99 90-320 to -322 (Supp. 1983).
72. See FA. STAT. ANx. 99 765.01-.15 (West Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-. 10 (West Supp.
1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. 99 24-7-1 to -11 (1978 & Supp. 1985); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 97.050-.090 (Supp. 1983); VA. CoDE
§ 54-325.8:3, 6 (Supp. 1985).
73. VA. CoD § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).
74. Contra CAL. HEALT & SAFET CODE § 7191(c) (West Supp. 1985).
75. Comment, North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Confronting Death with Dignity, 14 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 771,
787 (1978).
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respond that the patient may easily revoke his or her living will, orally or otherwise.7 6
Moreover, is a decision made in anticipation of death necessarily a better estimation
of a patient's true intent? A living will executed or reexecuted only after a terminal
diagnosis, as the California approach prefers, may suffer from the taint of the terminal
patient's death wish. According to Luis Kutner, prior Chairman of the World Habeas
Corpus Committee of the Center for World Peace Through Law, "[t]he study of
psychology and psychoanalysis has indicated that all men have a suppressed urge for
death, the death wish or thanos, which may emerge when an individual is seriously
ill.' ,77
If the question is close, why impair the rights of the patient who chooses to
memorialize his solemn decision prior to a terminal diagnosis? No one is forced to
execute a living will. Our hale and hearty executive may just as easily be a thoughtful
man of conscience who cherishes his right to self-determination. On balance, a
document that effectuates express written intent, without regard to date of execution,
seems preferable. Twenty of the twenty-three jurisdictions enacting living will
statutes agree.78
Though the North Carolina approach shares the positive attribute of prediagnosis
effectiveness with the majority of living will statutes, its hallmark lies in its treatment
of the comatose patient who has not executed a living will-a patient the California
approach ignores. The North Carolina approach provides a mechanism by which the
comatose patient who has not executed a living will may secure removal or exercise
refusal of life supports despite his or her present incompetency. 79 The mechanism
utilizes substituted judgement, allowing a patient's family members or legal guardian
to effectuate the patient's intent.80 Life supports may be withheld or withdrawn from
a terminally ill, comatose patient upon an agreement between his or her attending
physician and
any of the following individuals, in the following order of priority if no individual in a
prior class is reasonably available, willing and competent to act:
1. The judicially appointed guardian or committee of the person of the patient if one has
been appointed. This paragraph shall not be construed to require such appointment in order
that a treatment decision can be made under this section;
2. The person or persons designated by the patient in writing to make the treatment
decision for him should he be diagnosed as suffering from a terminal condition; or
3. The patient's spouse; or
76. See, e.g., N.C. GE. STAT. § 90-321(e) (1981); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:5 (Supp. 1985).
77. Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539, 545 (1969).
78. See ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (1984); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (Supp. 1985); DiL. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502
(1983); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 6-2422 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.04 (Vest Supp. 1985); GA. CODE § 31-32-3
(1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-103 (1980); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.58.3 (West Supp. 1985); Mtss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-105, -107 (Supp. 1984); NEv. Rsv. STAT.
§§ 449.600, .610 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (Supp. 1983); OR. REv.
STAT. § 97.055 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5253 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:3 (Supp. 1985); WA. REv.
CoDE ANN. § 70.122.030 (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CoDE § 16-30-3 (1985); Wo. STAT. Ann. § 154.03 (West Supp. 1985);
Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-145 (Supp. 1985).
79. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1983); VA. CoDE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1985).
80. See id.
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4. An adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more than one adult child, by a
majority of the children who are reasonably available for consultation; or
5. The parents of the patient; or
6. The nearest living relative of the patient. 8'
Should a physician refuse to comply with the decision of one of those persons
enumerated in subsections one through six, section 54-325.8:7 of the Virginia
Natural Death Act instructs that the physician is to make reasonable efforts to transfer
the patient to another physician. 82 Notably, the provision does not require refusal or
removal, but leaves the decision with those best suited to make it-the patient's legal
representative and family.
The North Carolina approach addresses the plight of Ohio's Karen Quinlans and
Edna Marie Leaches, unequivocally constituting an improvement over Leach I and I.
The North Carolina approach cautiously and clearly delineates who, under what
circumstances, may give force to an incompetent's informed consent and who may
exercise the incompetent's right of privacy. Further, this statutory scheme provides
a framework applicable to all similarly situated patients. The rules and law will not
vary, as they may under Leach I and II, with the court from which a plaintiff seeks
relief.8 3 In fact, the North Carolina approach, eliminating physician liability for
compliance with the act, 84 obviates the need for litigation. Free of liability and
equipped with clear statutory guidelines, physicians should be generally less reluctant
to accord life support treatment with patient intent.85 Finally, eliminating the need for
litigation decreases both the time that undesired life supports maintain a comatose
patient and the emotional and fiscal strain imposed upon his or her family.
As a matter of illustration, consider the Leach I facts with only one variation-
that Mrs. Leach becomes ill in a state adopting the North Carolina approach. Mrs.
Leach's husband, as both her spouse and her guardian, could, pursuant to the Natural
Death Act, direct the discontinuance of life supports. Her physician, assured of civil
and criminal immunity, may simply comply or transfer Mrs. Leach to a physician who
will. In sum, the statute, via substituted judgement, quickly and efficiently effectuates
Mrs. Leach's intent, obviates the need for a subsequent suit for wrongful application,
and eliminates her physician's liability.
C. The Uniform Approach
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),
authors of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act8 6 and the Uniform Determination of
Death Act,8 7 have proffered a tentative draft of the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
(RTIA), 88 a uniform living will statute. The statute parallels the North Carolina
81. VA. CoDE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1985).
82. Id. § 54-325.8:7.
83. See supra text pp. 1021, 1025.
84. See VA. CODE § 54-325.8:8 (Supp. 1985).
85. See Comment, The Virginia NaturalDeath Act-A CriticalAnalysis, 17 U. RicH. L. REv. 863, 871 (1982-83).
86. 99 1-11, 8A U.L.A. 30-67 (1983).
87. 99 1-3, 12 U.L.A. 271-72 (West Supp. 1985).
88. Ttm Rt"rrs OF THE TmELarua.LY Iu. ACT 99 1-12 (rent. Draft 1984).
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approach in certain important respects. RTIA cautiously outlines the rights of the
terminally ill patient to direct the withholding or withdrawal of life supports via a
simple written directive89 and provides physicians and other health care providers
immunity for following their patients' treatment decisions. 90 Further, RTIA provides
that an individual may execute a living will "at any time." 9 1 No postdiagnosis
requirement is imposed. But here the significant parallels stop.
RTIA in its current form fails to provide for the rights of comatose patients who
have not executed living wills, leaving the needs of these patients to state common
law. 92 Though uniformity may answer questions of reciprocity and solve the problems
implicated by a highly mobile population, a uniform act should glean the best
provisions from the several state acts. 93 To meet the needs of Ohio's terminally ill,
RTIA must adopt a North Carolina provision with respect to the comatose patient who
has no living will. To ignore these patients' needs is to retain the inadequacies of the
Leach decisions.
D. Toward an Ohio Act
If the insufficiencies of Ohio common law are to be remedied, the Ohio General
Assembly must act. Living will legislation is not new to Ohio's state legislators.
Considered in both the 114th and 115th General Assemblies, two living will proposals
failed to become Ohio law.94 According to a sponsor of both bills, State Represen-
tative Robert Nettle, two major factors caused the bills to languish in committee: 1)
unacceptable amendments tactically imposed by opposition forces in the 114th
General Assembly; and 2) election year fears of young legislators hoping to avoid the
potential wrath of the bill's detractors in the 115th General Assembly. 95 The 116th
General Assembly is currently reviewing House Bill No. 220 (H.B'. 220),96 another
proposed living will act. Consequently, the questions of whether and what kind of
living will legislation Ohio needs become all the more salient.
A legislative package worthy of enactment should address and correct the Leach
inadequacies, securing the terminal patient's right to self-determination. A synthesis
of NCCUSL's RTIA and H.B. 220 provides this package. RTIA offers the frame-
work: a carefully drafted bill which gives effect to a patient's express wishes whether
memorialized before or after a terminal diagnosis.97 RTIA adds the attraction of
potential uniformity, helping to insure that the situs of illness or injury will not impair
89. Id. at § 2.
90. Id. at § 7.
91. Id. at § 2(a).
92. See id. at § 9(d).
93. See Freamon, supra note 39, at 140.
94. Ohio H.B. 137, 114th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (198142); Ohio H.B. 331, 115th Gen. Assembly, Reg.
Sess. (1983-84).
95. Telephone interview (March 1, 1985).
96. Ohio H.B. 220, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1985-86). H.B. 220 passed the Ohio House of
Representatives on June 26, 1985 and is presently pending before the Ohio Senate.
97. THE RIGHTs OF THE TERIINALLY ILLAcr § 2 (rent. Draft 1984). Contra CAL. HEALI & SArsrY CODE § 7191(c)
(West Supp. 1985).
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a patient's rights. RTIA, however, does not include a North Carolina provision that
details the rights of the comatose patient who has not executed a living will.98
This gap may be filled with section 2108.38 of Ohio's own H.B. 220.99 Ohio Bill
section 2108.38 substantially parallels the previously discussed North Carolina
provisions, permitting a patient's spouse, guardian, or immediate family to effectuate
that patient's intent and protect a physician who acts at their direction from any
liability. 10 However, H.B. 220 improves on previous North Carolina provisions by
adding section 2108.38(B):
If the spouse, guardian, parents, adult children, or adult siblings of an adult in the
condition described in division (A) of this section disagree over the use, withholding, or
discontinuation of medical measures, any of them may apply to the probate court... for
an order on the use, withholding or discontinuation of medical measures.' 0o
This North Carolina provision takes away from the courts that which is more
efficiently decided elsewhere-what to do if the comatose patient's guardian, spouse,
and family all agree as to the patient's desires. The provision leaves to the court that
which courts are best suited to decide--disputes among interested parties.10 2
In sum, a revised RTIA, amended to include H.B. 220's section 2103.38,
significantly improves upon Ohio common law. Patients may expressly define the
scope of their informed consent via a written directive. Patients who do not execute
a directive may nevertheless obtain relief from undesired treatment. Physicians may
comply with their patients' desires without fear of liability. Importantly, Ohio law
under a synthesis of RTIA and H.B. 220 would be poised to handle the increasing
number of patients facing the life support decision. With the requirement of
cumbersome probate court litigation removed, physicians could tailor treatment to
their patients' informed instructions without clogging court dockets or paying legal
retainers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though no panacea, legislation clearly offers the surest means to fill the
insufficiencies of Ohio's life support law. Absent legislative action, Ohio's terminal
patients and their physicians can only hope the common law keeps pace with the
burgeoning advances in sophisticated medical technology. This is an unlikely pros-
pect. If the General Assembly remains silent, developing technology will exponen-
tially increase the number of patients and physicians forced to make life support
decisions in legal limbo, unsure of their rights and blind to their duties.
98. See supra text accompanying note 92.
99. Ohio H.B. 220, 116th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Seass. (1985-86).
100. Id. at § 2108.38(A).
101. Id. at § 2108.38(B).
102. The Washington Supreme Court supplemented that state's living will act, holding that in most instances no
judicial intervention is required to remove life supports from an incompetent. As in H.B. 220, litigation only becomes
necessary when disagreement arises among enumerated parties (for example, legal guardian, treating physicians,
prognosis committee). See In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
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if the General Assembly must act, it must do so prudently and comprehensively.
Poorly drafted stopgap measures will surely raise more questions than they answer.
An Ohio act must address all implicated patient groups: competent, comatose, those
who have executed a living will, and those who have not. The act must glean the best
provisions from the already proposed legislative responses. Finally, it must enable
physicians to effectuate patient intent without fear of liability. An amended RTIA
meets these requirements.
James M. Jones
